{"id":33607,"date":"2025-08-26T06:56:43","date_gmt":"2025-08-26T06:56:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/?p=33607"},"modified":"2025-08-26T06:56:44","modified_gmt":"2025-08-26T06:56:44","slug":"what-larijanis-return-as-security-tsar-reveals-about-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/2025\/08\/26\/what-larijanis-return-as-security-tsar-reveals-about-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"What Larijani\u2019s return as security tsar reveals about Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

In a move that surprised many in Iran<\/a>, former moderate parliament speaker Ali Larijani was recently appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the body that holds ultimate authority over the country\u2019s security and foreign policy decisions.<\/p>\n

The appointment, which must be approved by the supreme leader, raised eyebrows among observers, especially given Ali Khamenei\u2019s initial opposition to Larijani holding the same post at the start of reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian\u2019s term just a year ago.<\/p>\n

However, Khamenei\u2019s stance reportedly shifted as the council\u2019s former secretary, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, appeared increasingly weak amid a year of domestic unrest and regional turmoil – particularly in the wake of Israel<\/a>\u2019s 12-day war on Iran<\/a> in June.<\/p>\n

Larijani\u2019s appointment is especially notable given his fraught history with the Guardian Council, the Khamenei-controlled body that vets candidates for major elected office. The council had disqualified him from the last two presidential races, citing what it called a lack of \u201cprudence\u201c and insufficient executive experience.<\/p>\n

A former member of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Larijani served as secretary of the National Security Council from 2005 to 2007. His return to one of Iran\u2019s most critical security posts signals a recalibration of the internal balance of power within the establishment.<\/p>\n

Among principlists, Larijani is a polarising figure, facing strong opposition for two main reasons.<\/p>\n

First, his steadfast support for former moderate president Hassan Rouhani and his efforts to preserve the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) and pursue negotiations with the United States have long made him a target for conservative factions.<\/p>\n

Second, his appointment brings to light Iran\u2019s complex succession politics. His brother, Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, was once considered a serious contender to succeed Khamenei. However, his chances were ultimately undermined by internal rivalries and confrontations with radical loyalists within the political establishment.<\/p>\n

Sadeq is himself a hardliner, having served as the judiciary chief and led a harsh crackdown on media and dissent, and his political orientation diverges significantly from that of his brother. The contrast between the two highlights the nuanced and sometimes fractious dynamics of Iran\u2019s ruling elite.<\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, Ali Larijani\u2019s return to a top national security post may signal more than just a shift in policy – it could reflect subtle manoeuvring within the power structure.<\/p>\n

The central question now is whether Larijani\u2019s appointment will signal a broader shift in Tehran\u2019s foreign and domestic policy direction.<\/p>\n

A message for allies<\/span><\/p>\n

Known for his reformist leanings and earlier calls for rapprochement with the United States, Larijani\u2019s record points to a potential openness to diplomatic engagement. Yet it remains uncertain whether he will have the space to pursue such a course, given that Khamenei holds ultimate authority over security and foreign policy.<\/p>\n

A conservative source told Middle East Eye that Khamenei has granted Larijani some authority in foreign policy, though the scope of these powers is unclear.<\/p>\n

Since his appointment, Larijani has made visits to Beirut and Baghdad – two pillars of Iran\u2019s regional strategy, which depends heavily on allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon<\/a> and the Hashd al-Shaabi militias in Iraq<\/a> .<\/p>\n

Ahmad Zeidabadi, a prominent reformist commentator, wrote on his Telegram channel that during these visits that Larijani \u201cpresented himself as responsible for national security affairs in the Islamic Republic\u201d.<\/p>\n

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\u201cIf there is consensus among Iran\u2019s power bloc on the role Larijani has carved out for himself, he can no longer be dismissed as a powerless official without the authority to manage crises,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n

Zeidabadi stressed that \u201ca new balance is clearly taking shape, and no strategy to address crises can ignore its rules and parameters\u201d.<\/p>\n

The commentator concluded that Larijani has yet to clarify whether his focus will be on restoring domestic order, which has largely collapsed in recent years, or on protecting Iran\u2019s security and interests in a rapidly shifting regional context.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, a conservative analyst close to the Iranian establishment suggested that Larijani\u2019s visit to Beirut carried an important message for Iran\u2019s allies. He linked the trip to recent remarks by Hezbollah\u2019s leader Naim Qassem, as well as to statements from the leader of\u00a0Yemen<\/a>\u2019s Houthi movement criticising the Lebanese government.<\/p>\n

Earlier this month, the Lebanese government voted to adopt a US roadmap to disarm Hezbollah<\/a>. The Lebanese group rejected the move, with Qassem declaring that Hezbollah will not give up its arsenal as long as Israel remains occupying territory in southern Lebanon and carrying out near-daily attacks on the country.<\/p>\n

He also warned that the group was prepared to confront any attempt to force it to disarm.<\/p>\n

\u201cIn facing the US-Saudi<\/a> disarmament project, being implemented through Lebanese factions, Hezbollah is not alone. It receives operational as well as political support from both Iran and Yemen,\u201d the analyst said.<\/p>\n

\u201cWith this backing, Qassem has set out a new equation in response – one that involves resisting Israeli actions, issuing warnings to the US embassy, and even raising the prospect of civil war.\u201d<\/p>\n

Calls for flexible foreign policy<\/h3>\n

Despite Larijani\u2019s reformist leanings, a senior Iranian source told MEE that \u201cIran\u2019s broader strategic priorities will not change. Neither Tehran\u2019s nuclear stance nor its regional policies are expected to shift radically as a result of his appointment\u201d.<\/p>\n

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Larijani\u2019s role can therefore be interpreted as part of an internal realignment aimed at strengthening Iran\u2019s decision-making structures and consolidating the Islamic Republic\u2019s ability to manage crises at home and abroad.<\/p>\n

Observers in Tehran will be watching closely to see whether Larijani can navigate this complex terrain, manage internal rivalries and assert influence in shaping the country\u2019s next chapter of domestic and regional policy. Still, most believe tangible change is unlikely, as Khamenei will not allow it.<\/p>\n

An international relations university professor in Tehran told MEE: \u201cWith the recent changes in the Supreme National Security Council and the presence of Mr Larijani, the political atmosphere has become somewhat softer. Hard-liners have been pushed further from the decision-making process, and the overall environment is improving.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cThere is no alternative but negotiation because the situation is extremely difficult. Iran is caught between the United States, Europe, Israel, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The country must pursue a soft and pragmatic policy to overcome domestic, international, and regional challenges.\u201d<\/p>\n

‘Iran’s broader strategic priorities will not change as a result of Larijani’s appointment’<\/p>\n

– Senior source<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In the aftermath of the bruising war with Israel, many in Tehran have been calling on the state to recalibrate its foreign policy.<\/p>\n

They argue that the old approach – defined by inflexibility and the absence of relations with the US – must be abandoned, as it ultimately played into the hands of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.<\/p>\n

\u201cUnder these conditions, the old approach cannot be continued in full. Reconciliation [with the West] is the only viable path. The next step should be direct negotiations with the United States,\u201d the professor said.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe reality is that tactics of concealment and ambiguity will no longer work. Iran\u2019s position has changed, and policies must now be guided by logical reasoning. Any potential war can be managed through diplomacy, and I find it unlikely that direct negotiations would trigger immediate conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n

The professor, however, stressed he has seen no indication of a major shift in Iran\u2019s foreign policy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In a move that surprised many in Iran, former moderate parliament speaker Ali Larijani was recently appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the body that holds ultimate authority over the country\u2019s security and foreign policy decisions. The appointment, which must be approved by the supreme leader, raised eyebrows among observers, especially given Ali […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":33608,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[11],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-33607","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-middle-east"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33607","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=33607"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33607\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":33777,"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33607\/revisions\/33777"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/33608"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33607"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=33607"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cissar.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=33607"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}